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APPRENDI/BOOKER AND ANEMIC APPELLATE 
REVIEW* 
NANCY GERTNER** 
The Supreme Court’s case law following Apprendi v. New Jersey and United 
States v. Booker, and the decisional law of the federal appellate courts, have 
had unintended and less than salutary results. While the appellate courts were 
uniquely suited to offer a meaningful critique of the Federal Sentencing 
Guidelines (“Guidelines”) as well as substantive guidance about what non-
Guidelines sentencing might involve, they have largely abdicated those roles. 
Judicial critiques of the Guidelines could have made the U.S. Sentencing 
Commission more accountable and could have imposed the kind of review that 
other agency rules and criminal statutes receive by requiring that the Guidelines 
be aligned with the purpose of sentencing and based on studies and data. But 
since the appellate law requires nothing more than that the district courts 
compute the Guidelines correctly, there is no incentive to critique them. Nor 
have appellate courts provided any substantive guidance concerning what non-
Guidelines sentencing should involve or what principles should inform non-
Guidelines sentences. The result is that interpretation of the Guidelines has 
stalled, on the one hand, and the substantive law of sentencing is chaotic, on the 
other. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Apprendi v. New Jersey1 and United States v. Booker2 were watershed 
opinions without watershed results. Beginning with Apprendi, the U.S. Supreme 
Court ruled that the Constitution required what appeared to be a new role for 
the twentieth-century jury—namely, a role in sentencing. Justice Stevens, 
writing for the Court, held that the Sixth Amendment and the Due Process 
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment required that any fact (other than a prior 
conviction) which increases the maximum penalty for a crime must be found by 
a jury beyond a reasonable doubt rather than by a judge by a preponderance of 
the evidence.3 
A year later, in Booker, the Court concluded that the facts a jury had to 
decide under the Sixth Amendment now included those that the Federal 
Sentencing Guidelines (“Guidelines”) made relevant.4 Since the core 
constitutional violation in Booker was that judges, not juries, were finding 
sentencing facts with determinative sentencing consequences fixed by the U.S. 
Sentencing Commission (“Commission”), the cure, according to Justice Breyer, 
was to make the Guidelines advisory.5 While that result was heralded by district 
court judges, like me, who chafed under the Guidelines, it has not led to 
meaningful change in a deeply, deeply flawed federal sentencing system.6   
 
 1. 530 U.S. 466 (2000). 
 2. 543 U.S. 220 (2005). 
 3. Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 490. 
 4. Booker, 543 U.S. at 233. 
 5. Id. at 245. In a mandatory guidelines regime, what the judges did at sentencing looked exactly 
like what juries do—finding facts with determinate consequences, thereby usurping the jury’s role 
according to the Booker majority. Id. at 243–44. Indeterminate sentencing had not raised constitutional 
alarms, although it had other problems. Juries found facts subject to strict procedural rules; conversely, 
judges had a flexible role in individualized sentencing, with more lenient rules and lower standards. 
Nancy Gertner, Thoughts on Reasonableness, 19 FED. SENT’G REP. 165, 165 (2007). See generally Nancy 
Gertner, Juries and Originalism: Giving “Intelligible Content” to the Right to a Jury Trial, 71 OHIO ST. L.J. 
935, 937–38 (2010) (discussing the jury’s historical role in sentencing and arguing that the jury’s key 
role in determining sentences for crimes subject to mandatory minimums should require courts to give 
juries at least a cursory explanation of possible punishments). 
 6. See Albert W. Alschuler, The Failure of Sentencing Guidelines: A Plea for Less Aggregation, 58 U. 
CHI. L. REV. 901, 908 (1991) (providing a general critique of the Guidelines); Nancy Gertner, Against 
These Guidelines, 87 UMKC L. REV. 49, 51–52 (2018) [hereinafter Gertner, Against These Guidelines] 
(same). The Guidelines elevated the avoidance of sentencing disparity over all other purposes, like 
justice, fairness, and proportionality. And to accomplish this purpose, the Commission keyed 
sentencing to ostensibly objective factors like drug quantity, the amount of the fraud, or the offender’s 
criminal record, without meaningful consideration of what that quantity reflected (such as dealing 
drugs to get school supplies) or the racial bias that criminal records masked (such as “driving while 
Black” or over-policing in communities of color). Pre-Guidelines factors like mens rea, mental illness, 
trauma, and even drug or alcohol addiction were largely left out of the analysis. Important drivers of 
offending were ignored, creating a false uniformity in which unlike offenders were treated alike. The 
differential treatment between defendants charged with crack-cocaine sales (disproportionately Black) 
and defendants charged with cocaine sales (disproportionately White) was exacerbated. Finally, the 
Guidelines led to higher and higher sentences for these offenses, dramatically increasing mass 
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Booker and Apprendi created space for judicial discretion in the application 
of the Guidelines, altogether a good first step in my judgment. The critical 
question was what the next steps would be. Judicial discretion could have 
informed the development of sentencing in two respects. First, it could have 
provided a critique of the Guidelines, subjecting them to the kind of review that 
other agency rules and other criminal statutes receive. And by critiquing the 
Guidelines, courts could have made the Commission more accountable, forcing 
the Guidelines it promulgated to be more consistent with the Sentencing 
Reform Act of 1984 (“SRA”)7 and more aligned with the purposes of sentencing 
than they have ever been.  
That is what I tried to do while I was on the bench in the years before 
Booker and especially after. I wrote opinions that critically evaluated the 
Guidelines: Since only “extraordinary family circumstances” would qualify for 
a departure from the Guidelines—and a reduced sentence—it seemed important 
to critically analyze the term.8 What does “extraordinary family circumstances” 
mean after all?9 What did the Guidelines’ drafters see as the benchmark 
 
incarceration for all offenders and especially for people of color. Until 2014, the Commission used 
mandatory sentences as the base levels for the Guidelines, pushing sentences even higher than the 
Congressional minimums. Although the Guidelines are advisory now, they continue to exert an 
outsized influence on sentencing outcomes. Mass incarceration and racial disparities continue virtually 
unabated. Gertner, Against These Guidelines, supra, at 52–55. Notably, no other state or country has 
adopted the Guidelines model. Indeed, even the American Law Institute’s revision of the Model Penal 
Code on Sentencing expressly rejected the Guidelines model because it failed to provide adequate room 
for judicial sentencing discretion. See MODEL PENAL CODE: SENT’G § 6B.06 cmt. a (AM. L. INST., 
Proposed Final Draft 2017) (“Under the revised Code, the commission has no power to forbid or 
require the consideration of any sentencing factor.”); MODEL PENAL CODE: SENT’G REP. 115–25 
(AM. L. INST. 2003). Other critiques of the Guidelines include that the Guidelines treat in like manner 
offenders who are not at all alike, do not reflect in any coherent way the purposes of sentencing; ignore 
salient factors that could impact culpability; and finally, lead to extraordinarily harsh sentences without 
regard to proportionality. See, e.g., KATE STITH & JOSÉ A. CABRANES, FEAR OF JUDGING: 
SENTENCING GUIDELINES IN THE FEDERAL COURTS 104 (1998); Stephen J. Schulhofer, Assessing 
the Federal Sentencing Process: The Problem Is Uniformity, Not Disparity, 29 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 833, 836 
(1992). 
 7. Pub. L. No. 98-473, 98 Stat. 1987 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 18 U.S.C. and 
28 U.S.C.). 
 8. The Guidelines indicated that a departure for family circumstances was not “ordinarily 
relevant” but never defined what that the “ordinary family” was; there were no commentaries, no 
application notes, no examples, no findings, not even a rationale offered by the Commission. U.S. 
SENT’G GUIDELINES MANUAL § 5H1.6 (U.S. SENT’G COMM’N 2018). As Judge Jack Weinstein 
noted, “Given the multiplicity of family arrangements in New York City, the use of the term ‘ordinary’ 
in the Guidelines gives the judge little guidance.” Jack B. Weinstein, The Effect of Sentencing on Women, 
Men, the Family, and the Community, 5 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 169, 177–78 (1996). I tried to define 
the term and understand its relationship to the sentencing structure. I had to. I was sentencing 
individuals. See, e.g., United States v. LaCarubba, 184 F. Supp. 2d 89, 91 (D. Mass. 2002); United 
States v. Thompson, 74 F. Supp. 2d 69 (D. Mass. 1999), vacated, 234 F.3d 74 (1st Cir. 2000). 
 9. Chapter 5, Part H of the Guidelines listed offender characteristics which were “not ordinarily 
relevant” to whether a sentence should be outside the Guidelines range, including “family ties and 
responsibilities.” U.S. SENT’G GUIDELINES MANUAL § 5H1.6; see also United States v. Pereira, 272 
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“ordinary” family? On what data was this factor based? The Guidelines made 
distinctions between minimal and minor participants in a crime (different 
reductions in the Guidelines points for each), essentially picking numbers out 
of the air, largely without explanation.10 Why were the reductions for mitigating 
roles set where they were? One finding which could lead to an increase in the 
Guidelines score was that someone was an organizer or leader of an “extensive 
organization.” What does “extensive organization”11 mean, and where did this 
concept come from? In my view, the Guidelines were incoherent, offering the 
illusion of rationality and a thoughtful arithmetic exercise while actually 
providing “back of the envelope” calculations.12 I was not alone in these 
observations.13 
Second, increased judicial discretion post-Booker could have effected 
meaningful change in sentencing by creating a common law of sentencing:14 a 
judge-made sentencing framework supplementing, and perhaps supplanting, 
the Guidelines. Such a framework would go beyond my prior critiques, which 
amounted to describing what not to do, noting that this or that guideline was 
without basis or ambiguous. It would also outline what to do: namely, how to 
consider issues that the Guidelines had trivialized or excluded from the 
sentencing calculus, like mental health; neuroscientific insights into addiction 
 
F.3d 76, 81 (1st Cir. 2001) (excluding parental care from “extraordinary circumstances” for Guidelines 
departures); LaCarubba, 184 F. Supp. 2d at 91 (“[C]ourt[s] must measure the defendant against all 
other defendants, no matter the crime of his or her conviction, and determine whether he or she is 
‘irreplaceable.’”); Thompson, 74 F. Supp. 2d at 75–76 (defining extraordinary circumstances flexibly to 
reflect judges’ own past experiences as well as other cases of similarly situated offenders). 
 10. U.S. SENT’G GUIDELINES MANUAL § 3B1.2; see United States v. Cabrera, 567 F. Supp. 2d 
271, 277 (D. Mass. 2008) (stating that the Guidelines do not define “minimal” or “minor” and that the 
number of “points” seems “wholly arbitrary”); United States v. Jurado-Lopez, 338 F. Supp. 2d 246, 
254 (D. Mass. 2004) (reducing the Guidelines role adjustment for a woman who was used as a drug 
mule). 
 11. The government could seek an increase in the Guidelines range—which means a higher 
sentence—if a defendant was “an organizer or leader of a criminal activity that involved five or more 
participants or was otherwise extensive.” U.S. SENT’G GUIDELINES MANUAL § 3B1.1(a); see United 
States v. Footman, 66 F. Supp. 2d 83, 92–94 (D. Mass. 1999) (interpreting the meanings of 
“participant” and “otherwise extensive”); see also Panel III: Accomplishing the Purposes of Sentencing—The 
Role of Courts and the Commission, 15 FED. SENT’G REP. 179, 179 (2003). 
 12. For a similar critique of the Guidelines’ false rationality, see Michael Tonry, The Questionable 
Relevance of Previous Convictions to Punishments for Later Crimes, in PREVIOUS CONVICTIONS AT 
SENTENCING: THEORETICAL AND APPLIED PERSPECTIVES 91, 92 (Julian V. Roberts & Andrew von 
Hirsch eds., 2010). 
 13. Louis F. Oberdorfer, Mandatory Sentencing: One Judge’s Perspective—2002, 40 AM. CRIM. L. 
REV. 11, 17–18 (2003) (arguing that the Guidelines were flawed and suggesting that a common law of 
sentencing would produce fairer results). 
 14. See Douglas A. Berman, A Common Law for This Age of Federal Sentencing: The Opportunity and 
Need for Judicial Lawmaking, 11 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 93, 94 (1999) (arguing that a common law of 
departures could eventually emerge from appellate review of reasoned departures); Marc Miller, 
Purposes at Sentencing, 66 S. CAL. L. REV. 413, 419–20 (1992) (criticizing the Commission for failing 
to articulate a sentencing philosophy). 
99 N.C. L. REV. 1369 (2021) 
2021] APPRENDI AND ANEMIC APPELLATE REVIEW 1373 
or childhood adversity; or the advancement of sentencing theories, such as 
principles of proportionality, that the Guidelines’ drafters ignored. 
Neither alternative happened. Rather, post-Booker sentencing is what 
Professor Paul Hofer, former Senior Research Associate for the Commission, 
has described as a chaotic, “tragic mess.”15 
This Article examines the problems with post-Booker sentencing, 
specifically keying in on the role of the federal appellate courts. While they 
were uniquely suited to offer both a meaningful critique of the Guidelines as 
well as substantive guidance about what non-Guidelines sentencing might 
involve, they have largely abdicated those roles. Part I briefly explains the 
shortcomings of the Guidelines today. Part II addresses how institutional actors 
like district courts and Congress have exacerbated these shortcomings. Part III 
builds on my prior work by explaining the role of the appellate courts in our 
current state of post-Booker Guidelines confusion. 
I.  THE STATE OF SENTENCING TODAY 
If there ever was a moment for judges to critique the Guidelines, the years 
after Booker were it.16 If there ever was a moment for the emergence of a robust 
body of law that evaluated the Guidelines,17 the statutory purposes behind 
them, the basis for their promulgation, and whether that record was adequate 
or inadequate, the years after Booker were it.18 But that revolution did not 
 
 15. Paul Hofer, After Ten Years of Advisory Guidelines, and Thirty Years of Mandatory Minimums, 
Federal Sentencing Still Needs Reform, 47 U. TOL. L. REV. 649, 649 (2016) [hereinafter Hofer, After Ten 
Years]. 
 16. This was the kind of judicial input that some of the individuals who had participated in the 
Guidelines movement envisioned. See, e.g., Daniel J. Freed, Federal Sentencing in the Wake of Guidelines: 
Unacceptable Limits on the Discretion of Sentencers, 101 YALE L.J. 1681, 1694 (1992) (arguing that Congress 
envisioned a more interactive process for Guidelines development involving the Commission, judges, 
prosecutors, and defense attorneys). 
 17. For examples of cases in which this kind of analysis did take place, see United States v. 
Vanvliet, 542 F.3d 259, 271 (1st Cir. 2008) (holding that a district court can justify a sentence below 
the Guidelines’ sentencing ranges by citing disagreement with the Guidelines’ policy); United States 
v. White, 551 F.3d 381, 386 (6th Cir. 2008) (finding that a district court may choose a sentence outside 
of the Guidelines if the Guidelines range is too high or too low to accomplish the purposes of 
punishment); United States v. Garrison, 560 F. Supp. 2d 83, 87 (D. Mass. 2008) (finding that the 
Guidelines overemphasized the quantity of drugs possessed by the offender and underemphasized the 
offender’s minor role in the drug distribution organization); United States v. Grober, 595 F. Supp. 2d 
382, 412 (D.N.J. 2008) (holding that the Guidelines range was inapplicable in a case involving child 
pornography); United States v. Ennis, 468 F. Supp. 2d 228, 238 (D. Mass. 2006) (finding that the 
Guidelines’ career-offender provisions inadequately addressed the purposes of punishment). 
 18. Even the Booker promise of administrative procedural review of the Guidelines—wherein the 
Guidelines are stripped of the force of law, and the Commission is transformed into a more traditional 
administrative agency subject to review akin to that required by the Administrative Procedure Act, 
Pub. L. No. 79-404, 60 Stat. 237 (1946) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 5 U.S.C.)—was 
largely unfulfilled. See Kate Stith & Karen Dunn, A Second Chance for Sentencing Reform: Establishing a 
Sentencing Agency in the Judicial Branch, 58 STAN. L. REV. 217, 217 (2005). 
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happen. Ironically, this lack of action was the product of the Supreme Court’s 
efforts to structure sentencing in a two-step process post-Booker. Under this 
process, step one involved calculating the Guidelines range and identifying any 
departures that were specifically addressed in the Guidelines book.19 Step two 
involved looking at the factors in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a),20 such as the need for the 
sentence to “promote respect for the law,” “to protect the public,” and “to avoid 
unwarranted sentencing disparities.”21 Then, and only then, could the judge 
decide whether to vary from the Guidelines range.22 
In short order, it was clear that a sure-fire way to get reversed by the courts 
of appeals—even in the enlightened post-Booker world—was to incorrectly 
calculate the Guidelines in step one. As a result, most district court judges—
even those who were dissatisfied with the Guidelines computation—took no 
chances. Better to vary from the Guidelines under Booker at step two than to 
try to carve out new interpretations for departures from the Guidelines at step 
one. Indeed, the path of least resistance for judges would be to take the most 
crabbed, even discretion-limiting view of the Guidelines’ provisions possible at 
step one (usually the government’s position) and proceed directly to a step-two 
variance, where judges may take many more factors into account with less 
rigorous appellate review.23 
There are parallels here with the evolution of qualified immunity 
decisional law under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. After the Supreme Court held in Pearson 
v. Callahan24 that courts resolving government officials’ qualified immunity 
claims do not have to decide whether the plaintiff’s facts make out a violation 
of constitutional right (the merits prong) before asking whether the right was 
“clearly established” (the immunity prong),25 many courts simply stopped 
articulating the metes and bounds of § 1983 violations.26 The result was what 
 
 19. Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 49 (2007) (“[A] district court should begin all sentencing 
proceedings by correctly calculating the applicable Guidelines range[;] . . . the Guidelines should be 
the starting point and the initial benchmark.”). 
 20. Id. at 49–50. 
 21. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2)(A), (a)(2)(C), (a)(6). 
 22. Gall, 552 U.S. at 49–50. 
 23. See Irizarry v. United States, 553 U.S. 708, 714–15 (2008) (citation omitted) (“Although the 
Guidelines, as the ‘starting point and the initial benchmark,’ continue to play a role in the sentencing 
determination . . . there is no longer a limit . . . on the variances from Guidelines ranges that a district 
court may find justified under the sentencing factors set forth in 18 U.S.C. §3553(a).”). 
 24. 555 U.S. 223 (2009); see also Reichle v. Howards, 566 U.S. 658, 664 (2012) (affirming 
Pearson’s procedure and noting that deciding qualified immunity issues on the basis of the right not 
being “clearly established” by prior case law “comports with our usual reluctance to decide 
constitutional questions unnecessarily”). 
 25. Pearson, 555 U.S. at 236. 
 26. See, e.g., City & Cty. of San Francisco v. Sheehan, 135 S. Ct. 1765, 1775 (2015) (declining to 
decide a constitutional question and concluding only that the officer’s “failure to accommodate” mental 
illness during an arrest did not “violate[] clearly established law”). Christensen v. Park City Mun. 
Corp., 554 F.3d 1271 (10th Cir. 2009), involved a visual artist who attempted to display and sell his 
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two scholars described as “constitutional stagnation”: “Because many 
constitutional issues arise in cases subject to qualified immunity, if courts were 
simply to resolve such claims on the ground that there is no clearly established 
right, then the constitutional rights may never be clearly established—especially 
when new fact patterns and technologies are at issue.”27 
Likewise, few post-Booker courts were reexamining the contrived 
Guidelines rules themselves in any depth; they could compute them in as 
straightforward a manner as possible and vary if they did not like the result. 
Why bother to challenge what “extraordinary family circumstances” meant after 
all, or the Talmudic distinctions between minor or minimal participants, or take 
issue with the Guidelines’ failure to consider addiction, when you could go 
directly to the sentence you wanted to impose—as a variance. 
The second problem is that when judges chose to vary in the second stage 
of the analysis, few theorized about what they were doing and where their 
decision fit in a rational sentencing policy; they did not have to. Neither 18 
U.S.C. § 3553(a) nor the Supreme Court gave them much guidance. Judges had 
discretion. They could consider non-Guidelines factors and weigh them as they 
saw fit. Their decisions would be reviewed for “reasonableness” under an “abuse 
of discretion” standard, the most lenient appellate test.28 
But giving judges more discretion says nothing about how they should 
exercise it—based on what principles, under what theory, and with what 
 
artwork on public property. He was arrested for violating a city ordinance; the charges were eventually 
dropped. Christensen sued claiming a violation of the First Amendment. The Tenth Circuit declined 
to decide whether the artwork in question was protected by the First Amendment, determining instead 
that the right, whatever it was, was not clearly established. Id. at 1277; see also infra notes 90–91 and 
accompanying text. 
 27. Aaron L. Nielson & Christopher J. Walker, The New Qualified Immunity, 89 S. CAL. L. REV. 
1, 4 (2015). Professors Aaron Nielson and Christopher Walker performed a statistical review of the 
post-Pearson cases, concluding that: first, there is some empirical foundation for the concerns about 
constitutional stagnation; second, “there is disparity among [the] circuits regarding whether and how 
courts are reaching constitutional questions”; and third, there is an asymmetry in the development of 
the doctrine—judges who hold certain substantive views are more likely to decide the constitutional 
question than others. Id. at 6–7. 
 28. Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 46 (2007). “Abuse of discretion” review gives the trial 
judge the widest latitude in deference to the fact that the trial judge is in the best position to find the 
facts, to know the individual defendant, and to make credibility determinations. Carissa Byrne Hessick 
& F. Andrew Hessick, Appellate Review of Sentencing Decisions, 60 ALA. L. REV. 1, 14 (2008). While 
that is surely true, it also leads the appellate court to be overly deferential to the trial court, abdicating 
any responsibility to articulate substantive sentencing standards. Professors Carissa Byrne Hessick and 
F. Andrew Hessick describe the standard this way: “Abuse of discretion applies to those decisions that 
call upon the district court to exercise discretion, such as when the law does not prescribe a rule of 
decision other than to direct a court to balance competing interests in rendering judgment.” Id. Under 
an abuse of discretion standard, the “appellate court’s task is not to render a decision by reweighing the 
competing interests, but only to ensure that the district court’s weighing was permissible.” Id. At the 
same time, Professors C. Hessick and A. Hessick note that “reasonableness” review is actually 
inconsistent with an “abuse of discretion” standard. Id. at 16–17. 
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methodology. “Judicial discretion,” after all, is not a criminal justice policy; it 
simply describes who ought to make the decision about sentencing, not what the 
decision should be. Small wonder the result was chaotic, the continuation of 
Guidelines-speak in some courts or a cacophony of factors, depending upon who 
the judge was: 
Without a sentencing framework independent of the Guidelines by 
which to evaluate them, there is no way of understanding when they 
should be rejected or adjusted, what alternatives are appropriate and 
available, or what evidence-based practices can inform sentencing. 
Without an alternative framework, in short, calling the Guidelines 
“advisory” is a ruse.29 
In effect, old habits that predated the Guidelines persisted—habits like not fully 
explaining sentences (beyond Guidelines-speak), not meaningfully engaging 
with any kind of coherent methodology like proportionality review,30 not 
writing opinions, and not being trained in the exercise of the new discretion.31 
Which sentencing players could have stepped into the breach and provided 
that framework and coherence on both fronts—critical Guidelines analysis and 
a substantive theory of sentencing? The district courts, courts of appeals, the 
Commission, Congress? I have written about why district courts, the 
Commission, and surely Congress did not do so.32 Here, I focus on the appellate 
courts. Why have our courts of appeals not been able to provide meaningful 
substantive review of sentences when courts of appeals in other common-law 
 
 29. Gertner, Against These Guidelines, supra note 6, at 54–55. 
 30. Proportionality review, for example, might involve evaluating the gravity of the sentence 
relative to the offense, how the sentence compares with penalties for crimes of equal or greater 
seriousness within the same jurisdiction, or how the sentence compares with the sanctions imposed for 
the same offense in other jurisdictions. It might also entail determining whether the punishment is 
inconsistent with an accepted penological goal. See, e.g., Bruce W. Gilchrist, Disproportionality in 
Sentences of Imprisonment, 79 COLUM. L. REV. 1119, 1124 (1979). 
 31. I have previously argued that the Guidelines fundamentally changed federal judges’ 
approaches to sentencing. After decades of the Guidelines, federal judges began to behave like expert 
clerks in a civil code system:  
The Federal Sentencing Guidelines have been interpreted more like civil code than a statute 
in a common law regime: They were viewed as comprehensive; they were the work of 
“experts,” and if there were gaps, the experts, notably, the Sentencing Commission, had to fill 
them. The Commission would resolve circuit conflicts; the Commission would answer all 
questions. The judges were to be clerks, not interpreting the document, which after all, was 
essentially perfect, but simply providing sentencing “answers.” The premises were flawed. 
Nancy Gertner, From Omnipotence to Impotence: American Judges and Sentencing, 4 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 
523, 534 (2007) [hereinafter Gertner, Omnipotence to Impotence]; see also United States v. Jaber, 362 F. 
Supp. 2d 365, 371–76 (D. Mass. 2005) (criticizing the premises about the Guidelines that had been 
accepted uncritically by the federal bench). 
 32. See generally Gertner, Omnipotence to Impotence, supra note 31, at 532–35 (describing the myriad 
challenges faced by courts and Congress in providing a coherent framework for the Guidelines). 
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countries, like Canada or Australia, have? Sentencing history and confusing 
Supreme Court guidance provide some—not all—of the answer. 
But before I address the appellate courts, I provide a quick review of why 
district courts, the Commission, and Congress did not provide meaningful 
sentencing guidance, which made the appellate courts’ potential role all the 
more significant.33 
II.  THE DISTRICT COURTS 
The Guidelines reshaped the way that district court judges approached 
sentencing so that even when the Guidelines became advisory, most judges still 
followed them. Judges credited the Commission with a competence that it did 
not have and with work in promulgating the Guidelines that it did not do. 
Judges believed the Commission had expertise, had considered all aspects of 
sentencing, and that the Guidelines it promulgated were grounded in a careful 
empirical analysis—none of which was true.34 Twenty years of Guidelines 
sentencing had desensitized judges to longer and longer sentences. The issue 
was not “should this individual go to prison?”; more often, it was, “how much 
time?’’ By 2005, when Booker was decided, compliance with the Guidelines was 
at an all-time high.35 To be sure, there were exceptions in judges who criticized 
the Guidelines and who regularly departed from the Guidelines, but they were 
in the minority.36 
 
 33. Gertner, Against These Guidelines, supra note 6, at 54–55. As I noted, the fact is that 
[t]he Guidelines were not intended to be, and were not in fact, comprehensive. There were 
gaps, which the drafters acknowledged. They were not drafted by sentencing experts . . . . The 
Commission did not review the efficacy of sentences: Why ten years for one offense, five for 
another? . . . To the extent the guidelines were based on “scientific” data, the data was skewed, 
and at times, ignored. The Commission simply calculated the average length of sentences . . . 
and then increased them. The Guidelines were not even a restatement of existing sentencing 
standards. The Commission did not look closely at what factors judges actually used in 
calculating sentences. It simply compared gross sentencing outcomes and decided what factors 
must have been significant. 
Gertner, Omnipotence to Impotence, supra note 31, at 534–35. 
 34. Gertner, Against These Guidelines, supra note 6, at 56; see also STITH & CABRANES, supra note 
6, at 38–39, 110–12 (challenging the expertise of the Guidelines drafters, critiquing the empirical basis 
of the Guidelines, and suggesting that rather than being comprehensive, they were at best a rough cut 
of what a sentencing system should be). 
 35. See U.S. SENT’G COMM’N, U.S. SENTENCING COMMISSION FINAL QUARTERLY DATA 
REPORT 10 fig.A (2010), https://www.ussc.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/research-and-publications/ 
federal-sentencing-statistics/quarterly-sentencing-updates/USSC_2010_Quarter_Report_Final.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/YF3R-UQ77]; see also U.S. SENT’G COMM’N, SPECIAL POST-BOOKER CODING 
PROJECT 7 (2006), http://www.ussc.gov/Blakely/postBooker_052306.pdf [https://perma.cc/2JTC-
F9U3]. 
 36. See Paul J. Hofer & Mark H. Allenbaugh, The Reason Behind the Rules: Finding and Using the 
Philosophy of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 40 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 19, 79 (2003) (describing the fact 
99 N.C. L. REV. 1369 (2021) 
1378 NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 99-5 
Booker changed that pattern to a degree but not in a way that would 
contribute to a rational national-sentencing policy. It is not an 
oversimplification to say that there are two broad categories of district court 
judges after Apprendi and Booker: Guidelines judges and non-Guidelines 
judges.37 Guidelines judges recite the mantra, “Yes, I have discretion to depart 
or vary from the Guidelines, but no, I never or very rarely do.” In jurisdictions 
with crowded dockets (or where there is that perception) and in jurisdictions 
that suffered from rigorous Guidelines enforcement before Booker,38 the 
Guidelines are an easy default.39 Simply “do the numbers,” as the NPR program 
on the stock market suggests, and you can be efficient and avoid criticism.40 Do 
the opposite—depart from the Guidelines or vary—and you may have to hold 
hearings and explain yourself in written opinions because you are bound to 
invite appellate scrutiny.41 In fact, requiring the judge to compute the numeric 
Guidelines in the first instance—as Supreme Court case law directs—
 
that judges took advantage of the discretion that the Guidelines provided pre-Booker); Kate Stith, The 
Arc of the Pendulum: Judges, Prosecutors, and the Exercise of Discretion, 117 YALE L.J. 1420, 1447–48 (2008). 
 37. In part, this derives from the circuit in which the districts are located. Six circuits have 
adopted a “presumption of reasonableness” for within-Guidelines sentences. Compare United States v. 
Johnson, 445 F.3d 339, 341 (4th Cir. 2006) (adopting a presumption of reasonableness for within-
Guidelines sentencing), United States v. Alonzo, 435 F.3d 551, 554 (5th Cir. 2006) (same), United 
States v. Williams, 436 F.3d 706, 708 (6th Cir. 2006) (same), United States v. Mykytiuk, 415 F.3d 
606, 608 (7th Cir. 2005) (same), United States v. Lincoln, 413 F.3d 716, 717–18 (8th Cir. 2005) (same), 
and United States v. Kristl, 437 F.3d 1050, 1054 (10th Cir. 2006) (same), with United States v. 
Fernandez, 443 F.3d 19, 27 (2d Cir. 2006) (rejecting the presumption of reasonableness while noting 
that a within-Guidelines sentence will typically be upheld as reasonable). 
 38. Hofer, After Ten Years, supra note 15, at 650 (“Booker did not, however, establish the balance 
needed in federal sentencing. Mandatory minimums remain in effect and continue to override judicial 
discretion, and the guidelines recommendations, in thousands of cases a year. . . . Other guidelines 
recommendations reflect congressional directives, or the Commission’s own unsound decisions. The 
advisory guidelines exert a gravitational pull even when they recommend sentences far greater than 
necessary. Sentencing reform was a good idea, but the federal system has yet to try it.”). 
 39. In fact, after Booker, the Commission took pains to tout judicial compliance with the 
Guidelines. In 2011, the Commission Chair testified to Congress that 80.4% of all federal sentences 
from the prior year were “within the applicable advisory guideline range or below the range at the 
request of the government,” with 55.0% of all cases falling within the applicable range and 25.4% 
receiving a government-sponsored, below-range sentence (although that number includes variances to 
which the government agreed). See Uncertain Justice: The Status of Federal Sentencing and the 
U.S. Sentencing Commission Six Years After U.S. v. Booker: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Crime, 
Terrorism & Homeland Sec. of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 112th Cong. 10 (2011) (statement of Judge 
Patti B. Saris, U.S. Sent’g Comm’n), https://www.ussc.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/news/congressional-
testimony-and-reports/testimony/20111012_Saris_Testimony.pdf [https://perma.cc/W6UP-AQJS]; 
see also Michael Tonry, The U.S. Sentencing Commission’s Best Response to Booker Is To Do Nothing, 24 
FED. SENT’G REP. 387, 393 (2012). I would suggest that the Commission adjust its focus to judges 
who never, or very rarely, depart or vary. Those judges are arguably violating the constitutional 
proscriptions of Booker. 
 40. See Nancy Gertner, Judicial Discretion in Federal Sentencing–Real or Imagined?, 28 FED. SENT’G 
REP. 165, 165 (2016). 
 41. Id. at 165. 
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necessarily “anchors” judicial decision-making.42 And with respect to the non-
Guidelines judges, too many exercise their discretion without doing much 
beyond listing the § 3553(a) factors, with a perfunctory explanation that passes 
muster in most circuits.43 Worse, these judges will often vary in a way that is 
not reproducible by others—without writing an opinion.44 
III.  THE COMMISSION 
The Commission’s considerable resources post-Booker have too often been 
devoted to justifying its own existence, which means monitoring compliance 
with the Guidelines to show that the Guidelines still mattered even in cases 
when they should not.45 The Commission’s training modules and reports 
highlighting Guidelines compliance remained virtually unchanged.46 To attend 
a Commission sentencing conference, as late as 2017, or to review Commission 
training of judges, is to think you are in a time warp, as if Booker and its progeny 
 
 42. See Gertner, Omnipotence to Impotence, supra note 31, at 535; see also Mark Bennett, Confronting 
Cognitive “Anchoring Effect” and “Blind Spot” Biases in Federal Sentencing: A Modest Solution for Reforming 
a Fundamental Flaw, 104 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 489, 503–13 (2014); Nancy Gertner, What Yogi 
Berra Teaches About Post-Booker Sentencing, 115 YALE L.J. POCKET PART 137, 138 (2006) [hereinafter 
Gertner, What Yogi Berra Teaches]; Matthew Tokson, Judicial Resistance and Legal Change, 82 U. CHI. 
L. REV. 901, 949 (2015). 
 43. As Professor Hofer notes, “Booker empowered judges to critically evaluate the Guidelines’ 
recommendations, but many sentencing judges continue to be anchored to the Guidelines’ distorted 
starting point, and reluctant to engage in the critical policy analyses needed to evaluate the guidelines’ 
fairness and effectiveness.” Hofer, After Ten Years, supra note 15, at 693; see also William W. Berry III, 
Discretion Without Guidance: The Need To Give Meaning to § 3553 After Booker and Its Progeny, 40 CONN. 
L. REV. 631, 664 (2008). The First Circuit made clear that a judge’s reasons for a sentence do not even 
have to be explicit—they can be “inferred by comparing what was argued by the parties or contained 
in the pre-sentence report with what the judge did.” United States v. Coelho, 212 F. App’x 7, 8 (1st 
Cir. 2007) (quoting United States v. Jiménez-Beltre, 440 F.3d 514, 519 (1st Cir. 2006) (en banc)). 
 44. See Nancy Gertner, Supporting Advisory Guidelines, 3 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 261, 270, 278 
(2009) (describing continued Guidelines sentencing as the result of “the habits ingrained during twenty 
years of mandatory Guideline sentencing” and noting that “after the SRA, judges were trained only in 
the Guidelines”); Stith, supra note 36, at 1496–97 (concluding that “the gravitational pull of the 
Guidelines on the pendulum of sentencing practice remains strong” based, in part, on the reluctance of 
“incumbent sentencing decision makers” who were obliged to follow the Guidelines for two decades). 
 45. See Gertner, Against These Guidelines, supra note 6, at 53; see also J.C. Oleson, Blowing Out All 
the Candles: A Few Thoughts on the Twenty-Fifth Birthday of the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, 45 U. RICH. 
L. REV. 693, 725–26 (2011) (“But, curiously, even post-Booker, there has been a great deal of attention 
paid to rates of departures and variances. Judges worried that if they took a ‘free at last, free at last’ 
approach, Congress might respond with a ‘Booker fix’ even more restrictive than the mandatory 
Guidelines. So judges monitored sentencing trends closely, as did the Commission and a vigilant 
Congress. Even now, the Commission presents its data by comparing post-Booker statistics against pre-
Booker rates of departures, even though pre-Booker Guidelines achieved their compliance rates by 
violating the Sixth Amendment.”). 
 46. U.S. SENT’G COMM’N, FEDERAL SENTENCING: THE BASICS 7–8 (2020) [hereinafter 
U.S.  SENT’G COMM’N, THE BASICS], https://www.ussc.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/research-and-
publications/research-publications/2020/202009_fed-sentencing-basics.pdf [https://perma.cc/SAA8-
LM7J]. 
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never happened.47 The Commission regularly issues reports—which many have 
criticized—suggesting that racial bias has seeped into judicial decision-making 
with the Booker regime, as if it were absent before then.48 Furthermore, the 
Commission’s website and training ignore lower court decisions of those judges 
who have in fact tried to theorize about sentencing.49 The Commission does not 
showcase meaningful alternatives to incarceration, describe the programs that 
are the most efficacious, or encourage judges to consider them. If they did, they 
would be encouraging noncompliance with the Guidelines, their raison d’être. 
It did not have to be this way. The Commission could have used whatever 
expertise it had to conduct studies reflecting (to the extent possible) what works 
to deter crime and restore offenders, undo the effects of mass incarceration, and 
reduce racial sentencing disparities. And those reasoned studies, and the 
proposals for sentencing they would generate, could be used to guide the new 
judicial discretion rather than to justify unquestioned Guidelines following.50 
The Commission could become the repository of studies from other credible 
sources on recidivism, alternatives to incarceration, and evidence-based 
practices; it could gather information about the developing common law of 
 
 47. Gertner, Against These Guidelines, supra note 6, at 54. 
 48. See Paul J. Hofer, The Commission Defends an Ailing Hypothesis: Does Judicial Discretion Increase 
Demographic Disparity?, 25 FED. SENT’G REP. 311, 312 (2013) (suggesting that there was disparity, 
including racial disparity, pre-Booker); Sonja B. Starr & M. Marit Rehavi, Mandatory Sentencing 
and Racial Disparity: Assessing the Role of Prosecutors and the Effects of Booker, 123 YALE L.J. 2, 5 
(2013) (identifying the role of prosecutors’ charging decisions in racial disparity); U.S. 
SENT’G COMM’N, FIFTEEN YEARS OF GUIDELINES SENTENCING: AN ASSESSMENT OF 
HOW WELL THE FEDERAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM IS ACHIEVING THE GOALS 
OF SENTENCING REFORM 113–14 (2004) [hereinafter U.S. SENT’G COMM’N, FIFTEEN 
YEARS],  https://www.ussc.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/research-and-publications/research-projects-
and-surveys/miscellaneous/15-year-study/15_year_study_full.pdf [https://perma.cc/K3WD-ZZ39]. 
Commission reports also focus only on the Guidelines’ factors; if a judge considers a factor outside of 
the Guidelines, such as educational background or post-traumatic stress disorder, that judge’s analysis 
is not covered by or included in the Commission studies. Nancy Gertner, Judge Identifiers, TRAC, and 
a Perfect World, 25 FED. SENT’G REP. 46, 46 (2012). 
 49. See, e.g., U.S. SENT’G COMM’N, THE BASICS, supra note 46, 28–29 (mentioning departures 
and variances without explaining courts’ stated reasons for varying or providing examples); Search 
Results: “Gertner”, U.S. SENT’G COMM’N, https://www.ussc.gov/search/site/gertner [https://perma.cc/ 
42PA-GB5H] (revealing that none of Judge Gertner’s opinions critiquing the Guidelines appear when 
searching her name on the Commission’s website). 
 50. Gertner, Against These Guidelines, supra note 6, at 50–51. 
99 N.C. L. REV. 1369 (2021) 
2021] APPRENDI AND ANEMIC APPELLATE REVIEW 1381 
sentencing, analyzing the reasons for and results of judges’ departures from the 
Guidelines.51 None of that has happened.52 
IV.  CONGRESS 
The Booker remedial majority acknowledged that the “ball now lies in 
Congress’ court” to create a sentencing system compatible with the 
Constitution.53 Congress, however, dropped the proverbial ball. It refused to 
repeal all mandatory minimum sentences, instead making only minor 
adjustments to such sentences through bills like the First Step Act.54 It 
approved reductions in the Guidelines ranges proposed during the Obama 
Administration,55 but these reductions—while helpful—were limited. Neither 
Congress nor the Commission has considered a more substantial overhaul—a 
better-articulated statement of sentencing principles undergirding the 
Guidelines, grounding specific Guidelines provisions in administrative findings 
of fact and empirical studies, and considering a wide range of evidence-based 
sentencing alternatives. Again, history is relevant: Prior to the Guidelines, 
Congress reflected a hands-off attitude to sentencing, providing broad 
sentencing ranges per offense with virtually no guidance as to how a judge 
 
 51. See, e.g., Michael S. Tunink, A New Role for the United States Sentencing Commission in Post-
Booker Sentencing, 40 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1429, 1430 (2008) (“[T]he Commission must develop a framework 
that establishes a dialogue between the Commission and the judiciary by incorporating departures and 
variances as amendments to the Guidelines in an attempt to reflect current judicial sentencing practice. 
Second, the Commission should further cultivate judicial compliance by articulating the specific 
penological reasons for the existing Guidelines and for each subsequent amendment to the Guidelines. 
This will provide the foundation for a collaborative dialogue between the judiciary and the 
Commission . . . .”). 
 52. Compare the work of the Commission with that of the Victoria (Australia) Sentencing 
Advisory Council. About Us: Establishment and Functions, SENT’G ADVISORY COUNCIL, 
http://www.sentencingcouncil.vic.gov.au/about-us [https://perma.cc/AJ4Z-2U5J]. In 2014, for 
example, the Victoria prosecutor who serves as the Director of Public Prosecutions, applied to the 
Victoria Court of Appeal for a “guideline judgment.” See Boulton v The Queen (2014) 42 VR 308, 311–
12 (Austl.). This judgment was, in effect, an advisory opinion on the standards for using a community 
correction order (similar to a probationary sentence). Id. While the Victoria Sentencing Advisory 
Council mainly generates high quality studies on a variety of sentencing issues, in this instance it was 
asked to participate in the guideline judgment process by providing its views to the Director of Public 
Prosecutions and to the court. Id. The court carefully considered the proposed guideline judgment and 
adopted it, both to resolve the cases before the court and to establish a precedent for similar cases. Id. 
 53. United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 265 (2005). 
 54. Pub. L. No. 115-391, 132 Stat. 5194 (2018) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 21 
U.S.C.); id. § 102, 132 Stat. at 5220–21 (reducing certain enhanced mandatory minimum penalties for 
some drug offenders); see also NATHAN JAMES, CONG. RSCH. SERV., R45558, THE FIRST STEP ACT 
OF 2018: AN OVERVIEW 8–9 (2019) (describing the limited sentencing reforms enacted under the First 
Step Act). 
 55. See, e.g., Fair Sentencing Act of 2010, Pub L. No. 111-220, §§ 5–7, 124 Stat. 2372, 2373–74 
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 18 U.S.C.). 
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should sentence within them.56 With the Guidelines, a switch was flipped, and 
Congress took a totally hands-on approach, creating new mandatory minimum 
sentences and even directing the Commission—the “expert agency” to which it 
had turned to rationalize sentencing—to increase sentencing ranges.57 
V.  APPELLATE REVIEW 
A. Before Booker 
The history of sentencing appellate review, which I touch on briefly below, 
is critical to understanding why the courts of appeals behaved as they did post-
Booker. Before the implementation of the Guidelines, there was essentially no 
appellate review of federal sentencing.58 As a 1964 note in the Yale Law Journal 
stated, “It appears well settled that federal appellate courts will not review a 
sentence that is within statutory limits.”59 The appellate courts even refused “to 
disturb an obviously excessive sentence within statutory limits.”60 Without 
meaningful appellate review, lower courts had no incentive to articulate 
consistent sentencing standards or theories, laying the groundwork for the 
sentencing critique of reformers in the 1970s and 1980s.61 
While other countries’ common-law appellate courts regularly reviewed 
sentences of lower courts using the principles of proportionality and developed 
 
 56. See, e.g., Nancy Gertner, A Short History of American Sentencing: Too Little Law, Too Much Law, 
or Just Right, 100 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 691, 696 (2010) (discussing the discretion given to 
judges in determining sentences). 
 57. See, e.g., Sex Crimes Against Children Prevention Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-71, §§ 2–4, 
109 Stat. 774, 744 (1995) (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 994) (directing the Commission to increase the base 
offense level for certain sexual offenses against children); Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 
100-690, § 6454, 102 Stat. 4181, 4372 (1988) (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 994) (directing the Commission 
to increase the minimum offense level for drug offenses involving minors). See generally U.S. SENT’G 
COMM’N, FIFTEEN YEARS, supra note 48, at B-1 to -11 (listing the congressional directives given to 
the Commission after the enactment of the Sentencing Reform Act).  
 58. See, e.g., STITH & CABRANES, supra note 6, at 111 (“Federal appellate courts had no occasion 
to develop or expound general principles of sentencing justice.”). The doctrine of nonreviewability of 
sentences “prevailed from 1891 until 1987” when the Guidelines were passed. Kevin R. Reitz, Sentencing 
Guideline Systems and Sentence Appeals: A Comparison of Federal and State Experiences, 91 NW. U. L. REV. 
1441, 1444 (1997). 
 59. Note, Appellate Review of Sentencing Procedure, 74 YALE L.J. 379, 381 (1964). 
 60. Comment, Appellate Modification of Excessive Sentences, 46 IOWA L. REV. 159, 160 (1960). 
 61. See MARVIN E. FRANKEL, CRIMINAL SENTENCES: LAW WITHOUT ORDER 5 (1973). 
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a common law of sentencing,62 the United States had no such tradition.63 
Indeed, some scholars have suggested there was general hostility to the idea: 
Professor Vicki Jackson notes that the reticence was caused by the U.S. legal 
“culture of authority, in which the only question is whether the government 
actor has jurisdiction.”64 Some would argue proportionality was an approach 
that was not even within the competence of the American judiciary, although 
other common law courts had no comparable problem.65 On this view, 
proportionality was too policy-centered, even “activist”—a normative task 
better left to the legislature.66 Professor Michael Tonry suggests that these 
attitudes were exacerbated by America’s fraught race relations: crime was 
“racialized” in political campaigns, especially in the Republican party’s 
Southern strategy to win over White voters.67 No one, least of all the courts, 
was about to second guess the decisions of the political branches, no matter how 
biased.68 
Into the mix came the SRA and the Guidelines. The SRA introduced 
appellate review of Guidelines sentencing, even substantive appellate review.69 
For appellate judges who had had no prior experience in sentencing and no 
other framework by which to evaluate district court sentences—such as a 
proportionality principle—the eight-hundred-plus-page Guidelines manual was 
all there was. It was no surprise that for the first two decades of the Guidelines, 
appellate review almost exclusively mandated compliance with the Guidelines 
 
 62. See Vicki C. Jackson, Constitutional Law in an Age of Proportionality, 124 YALE L.J. 3094, 3186 
(2015) (examining Canadian cases in which the courts applied their “own judge-made rule of ‘gross 
proportionality’” to all criminal punishments); see also Briana Lynn Rosenbaum, Sentence Appeals in 
England: Promoting Consistent Sentencing Through Robust Appellate Review, 14 J. APP. PRAC. & PROCESS 
81, 85 (2013) (“The English Court of Appeal—Criminal Division has a hundred-year-long history of 
appellate-court development of sentencing principles through common-law review of sentencing 
decisions.”). 
 63. See Marissa L. Marandola, Appellate Review of Sentences: Towards a Proportionality 
Approach to Substantive Reasonableness Review 6 (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author) (“In 
the absence of substantive appellate review, no common law of sentencing developed in the United 
States, even as other common law countries moved ahead with the project of introducing 
proportionality review in their respective appellate bodies.”). 
 64. Vicki C. Jackson, Thayer, Holmes, Brandeis: Conceptions of Judicial Review, Factfinding and 
Proportionality, 130 HARV. L. REV. 2348, 2367 (2017). 
 65. See Nancy Gertner, On Competence, Legitimacy and Proportionality, 160 U. PA. L. REV. 1585, 
1585–86 (2012). 
 66. Professor Jackson describes this as “value skepticism” which leads to a “hesitation to deal head-
on with the relative importance of different constitutional values” in the judicial venue. Jackson, supra 
note 64, at 2368, 2375. 
 67. Michael Tonry, Explanations of American Punishment Policies: A National History, 11 
PUNISHMENT & SOC’Y 377, 386–89 (2009). 
 68. Id. 
 69. See Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, § 213(a), 98 Stat. 1987, 2011–13 
(1984) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 3742). 
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and reversed judicial departures.70 The result: While the appellate courts held 
district court judges strictly accountable to the Guidelines, they did not hold 
the Commission accountable to the language of the SRA or the general purposes 
of sentencing, nor did they demand the Commission provide data for the 
sentencing rules it promulgated. The appellate courts eschewed any kind of 
meaningful review.71 
B. After Booker 
The Booker remedy required that appellate courts review sentences to 
ensure that they are both substantively and procedurally “reasonable” with 
regard to statutorily enumerated sentencing factors.72 Procedural review was 
easy; review of Guidelines computations was what the appellate courts had been 
doing for decades. But substantive review raised new possibilities, a new way to 
refresh and reconsider the flawed Guidelines framework. Even properly 
computed Guidelines sentences could be “unreasonable.” (In fact, 
“unreasonable” was the mild way to describe some properly computed 
Guidelines sentences; more appropriate terms were unjust, unfair, and 
disproportionate.)73 
 
 70. See, e.g., Gertner, What Yogi Berra Teaches, supra note 42, at 137 (“Like the Commission, the 
appellate courts fixated on Guideline enforcement. Most decisions were formulaic; few ever mentioned 
sentencing purposes. The goal of departure review was to circumscribe it.”). Some courts were more 
forgiving about Guidelines departures, even pre-Booker. See, e.g., United States v. Roberson, 872 F.2d 
597, 597 (5th Cir. 1989); United States v. Weaver, 920 F.2d 1570, 1570 (11th Cir. 1991). 
 71. See Marandola, supra note 63, at 1. 
 72. United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 261 (2005). Justice Breyer’s decision converted the 
Guidelines to an advisory regime by excising two provisions of the SRA that made the Guidelines 
binding: 18 U.S.C. §§ 3553(b)(1) and 3742(e). Id. 
 73. See Nancy Gertner, How To Talk About Sentencing Policy—and Not Disparity, 46 LOY. U. CHI. 
L.J. 313, 323 (2014). I have written about one of the men I sentenced, Damien Perry. Id. at 320. He 
was accused of distributing crack in small quantities on a street corner. For over a year, undercover 
officers rode bicycles to buy crack from him and others on the block. Id. He had no weapon, and he 
could not cooperate with the government because he did not know enough. Id. at 320–21. The 
government wanted to “count” not only the drug distributions to which he pled guilty, but also other 
instances for which they did not charge him. While he had no record, the government argued that he 
should get over ten years—which was the Guidelines mandated sentence based on the drug quantity, 
both charged and uncharged. Id. at 322. But the Guidelines did not account for the fact that Perry had 
a bullet in his brain that could not be removed or that he was only twenty-one-years-old at the time of 
the crime. Id. at 321, 323. There was no place on the grid for the fact that he did not know his mother 
very well, she was seventeen when he was born, and she was addicted, a prostitute, and later jailed. Id. 
at 321. He did not have any contact with his father until he was nearly ten. He was out of school by 
the tenth or eleventh grade, with little or no support network. Id. The Guidelines sentence, even if 
properly computed, was plainly unjust and substantively unreasonable by any measure in a rational 
sentencing system. In another case, United States v. Wilkerson, 183 F. Supp. 2d 373 (D. Mass. 2002), 
the defendant, a nonviolent street dealer, was convicted of distribution of crack cocaine. Id. at 373. 
Wilkerson, homeless at fourteen-years-old, sold crack to buy school supplies for his siblings. Id. at 375. 
The government wanted 140 to 175 months, increasing the mandatory minimum sentence of 120 
months. Id. at 375–76. The mandatory sentence was triggered by a prior minor district court drug 
offense. Id. I wrote: “The tragic bottom line is that for a non-violent street dealer for whom dealing 
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Given the pre-Guidelines history of appellate review of sentencing 
fairness—or, more accurately, the lack thereof—it was especially important for 
the Supreme Court to provide guidance as to what “reasonableness” meant in 
the context of “substantive review.” It did not.74 In United States v. Rita,75 in 
which the Court affirmed a within-Guidelines sentence, the Court allowed but 
did not require appellate courts to adopt a rebuttable presumption that a 
sentence within the Guidelines range is reasonable.76 The presumption, the 
Court emphasized, did not mean that appellate courts ought to give deference 
to the Commission similar to that enjoyed by administrative agencies (or, 
indeed, the deference that the Commission received prior to Booker).77 That 
disclaimer notwithstanding, Rita’s message was that following the Guidelines 
still trumped all other approaches. Even in jurisdictions where the appellate 
courts did not adopt a “presumption of reasonableness,” Rita provided a 
continued justification for deference to the Guidelines.78 According to Justice 
Breyer, one of the Guidelines’ authors, deference was entirely appropriate 
because the Guidelines reflected a “rough approximation of sentences that 
might achieve § 3553(a)’s objectives.”79 While the Court also announced that 
the standard of review would be a forgiving one—abuse of discretion80—that 
lenient standard hardly made a meaningful difference for judges’ computations 
under the Guidelines. As I describe below, few judges were exercising their 
discretion to critique the Guidelines at all. 
Gall v. United States81 was one of the first of Booker’s progeny, offering the 
promise of articulating what the post-Booker world of sentencing would look 
like. In Gall, the Court affirmed the sentence of a trial judge who had varied on 
non-Guidelines grounds,82 the kind of decision that would not have passed 
muster pre-Booker. But the Court then proposed to structure post-Booker 
appellate discretion in a way that substantially impacted the development of 
non-Guidelines substantive sentencing theory. Under Gall, courts were obliged 
to use a two-step process on appeal: First, appellate courts should review the 
procedures used to impose the sentence, including failure to calculate or 
improperly calculating the Guidelines range.83 Then and only then, if there is 
 
drugs, although wrong, may well have meant survival, Mr. Wilkerson will be obliged to serve ten years 
in jail.” Id. at 376. 
 74. See Carissa Byrne Hessick, Booker in the Circuits: Backlash or Balancing Act?, 6 HLRE: OFF 
REC. 23, 31–33 (2015) [hereinafter Hessick, Booker in the Circuits]. 
 75. 551 U.S. 338 (2007). 
 76. See id. at 338–39. 
 77. See id. at 347, 351. 
 78. See id. at 350. 
 79. Id. 
 80. See Id. at 361 (Stevens, J., concurring). 
 81. 552 U.S. 38 (2007). 
 82. See id. at 38–39. 
 83. Id. at 51. 
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no procedural defect, the court should look to substantive reasonableness.84 
With respect to the latter step, the Supreme Court did not have much to say 
except to consider “the totality of the circumstances, including the extent of any 
variance from the Guidelines range.”85 
The emphasis on Guidelines computation, after a twenty-year tradition of 
rigorous Guidelines enforcement, coupled with the absence of any tradition of 
appellate review and the vagueness of the second prong—a variance in the light 
of the general purposes of sentencing in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)—had a predictable 
result. Federal judges—both trial and appellate—knew how to do Guidelines 
analysis; what they knew less about were the substantive standards for variance. 
The Supreme Court did not help. 
After Gall, and just as before, it was clear that a federal judge would be 
reversed if they got the numbers wrong, no matter what else they did at the 
second step. And just as before, if they did the computations correctly, virtually 
any sentences conforming with the Guidelines would receive near-blanket 
deference, often without reference to any reasons other than the existence of 
the Guidelines themselves.86 Appellate courts, after looking at the column of 
figures that is Guidelines analysis, rarely say that a sentence is disproportionate 
to the offense or the characteristics of the offender.87 Appellate judges who 
never did such substantive analysis pre-Guidelines, and did not have to do it in 
the mandatory Guidelines regime, were unable or reluctant to engage in it post-
Gall. The most important questions were still: “Did you calculate the 
Guidelines accurately?” “Did you make any mistakes?” No one asked: “Did you 
appropriately deal with the defendant’s addiction?” “Did you consider 
alternatives to incarceration?” 
 
 84. Id. 
 85. Id. Kimbrough v. United States, 522 U.S. 85 (2007), decided on the same day as Gall, affirmed 
a trial judge who departed from the Guidelines based only on policy disagreements with the 
Commission. See id. at 91. It seemed to expand the area for judicial discretion; the Court was willing 
to tolerate “some departures from uniformity” as a “necessary cost of the remedy” to the constitutional 
violation identified in Booker. Id. at 108. What “some departures from uniformity” meant was less than 
clear. 
 86. See, e.g., United States v. Harry, 816 F.3d 1268, 1284 (10th Cir. 2016) (“[W]hen a district 
court imposes a within-Guidelines sentence, the court must provide only a general statement of its 
reasons, and need not explicitly refer to either the § 3553(a) factors or respond to every argument for 
leniency that it rejects in arriving at a reasonable sentence.” (quoting United States v. Lente, 647 F.3d 
1021, 1034 (10th Cir. 2011))); Kevin R. Reitz, The Enforceability of Sentencing Guidelines, 58 STAN. L. 
REV. 155, 171 (2005) (concluding that the post-Booker Guidelines “remain as restrictive of judicial 
sentencing discretion as any system in the United States”). Professor C. Hessick highlights how little 
is asked of a within-Guidelines sentence in her description of the “brief, but legally sufficient,” 
explanation provided by the lower court in Rita. Hessick, Booker in the Circuits, supra note 74, at 28–
29. 
 87. Paul J. Hofer, Empirical Questions and Evidence in Rita v. United States, 85 DENV. U. L. REV. 
27, 31–32 (2007) (“Data gathered by the NYCDL showed that, of 1,152 appeals of within-guideline 
sentences in the post-Booker period, . . . only one . . . was because the sentence was found substantively 
unreasonable.”). 
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C. Guidelines Interpretation Stalls 
As such, district court judges now have every incentive to adopt the most 
conservative calculations possible under the Guidelines and to address any 
resulting “unreasonable” sentences during a two-step variance. Interpretation 
of the Guidelines, let alone critiques of the Guidelines, is nonexistent. Sadly, 
even post-Booker, the Commission gets a pass for Guidelines that are vague, 
inconsistent with the purposes of sentencing, not empirically justified, or 
simply invented by the Commission without a reasonable explanation. 
When I teach sentencing to judges, I ask, “Why didn’t you consider this 
or that Guidelines enhancement? Did it not make sense, or was it ambiguous?” 
They say, “Why bother?” and “Why risk reversal?” Rather than struggle with 
the Guidelines that still frame sentencing, they would rather vary at the second 
step in a space without any standards.88 So, in the case of a drug addict charged 
with a drug offense, it would be easier to accept the Guidelines’ admonition that 
“drug or alcohol dependence or abuse is not a reason for a downward 
departure,”89 calculate the Guidelines sentence without that adjustment, and 
then take addiction into account as one of the factors under § 3553(a). 
The result of this standardless variance is the kind of murkiness in the 
decisional law that one also sees in cases under § 1983. The Supreme Court in 
Pearson provided the lower courts with the freedom to avoid the merits question 
in civil rights cases—whether there was a violation of a constitutional right—
and go directly to the second prong of the qualified immunity analysis—
whether the constitutional right at issue was “clearly established.”90 The result 
of this merits avoidance was that constitutional rights were not clarified, and 
the decisional law stalled.91 
While here, the trial court is obliged to decide the Guidelines 
computation, but they are not required to delve too deeply. Whatever the 
computation is—typically, the most rigid, discretion-limiting interpretation—
district court judges will accept it and save their concerns for the variance stage. 
D. Substantive Standards (Apart from the Guidelines) Fail To Develop 
The variance standards (the § 3553(a) factors) likewise could not be any 
vaguer.92 Section 3553(a) is, in effect, just a catalogue of all the purposes of 
sentencing, in no particular order and with no particular direction. This is an 
“everything-you-wanted-to-consider-in-sentencing-but-were-afraid-to-ask” 
list: the nature and circumstances of the offense and the history and 
 
 88. See supra Part I (discussing the lack of coherent theory behind second-stage variance). 
 89. U.S. SENT’G GUIDELINES MANUAL § 5H1.4 (U.S. SENT’G COMM’N 2018). 
 90. See Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 225 (2009). 
 91. See supra notes 24–27 and accompanying text (discussing this process in the context of 
Pearson). 
 92. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). 
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characteristics of the defendant;93 the need for the sentence imposed to “reflect 
the seriousness of the offense,”94 to effect deterrence,95 to promote public 
safety,96 and to provide the defendant with needed services;97 the need to avoid 
sentencing disparity;98 and the need to provide victims with restitution.99 In 
many jurisdictions, procedural review of variances is perfunctory: the district 
court does not have to say much to justify a variance.100 In others, the appellate 
courts require at least some reasonable explanation.101 And as to substantive 
review, while Gall acknowledges its importance in the second prong on the two-
part test, the Supreme Court did not expand on it beyond calling for judges to 
look at the “totality of the circumstances.”102 On the rare occasions when the 
appellate courts do determine that an outside-the-Guidelines sentence is 
unreasonable, the analysis is muddy.103 For example, courts rarely lay down 
principles that would help district court judges impose “reasonable” sentences 
in future cases.104 Some appellate courts—but not all—reflect the same hostility 
to substantive review as we saw with respect to proportionality analysis, viewing 
substantive review as “an invitation to mischief by tinkering with any sentence 
that appellate judges simply do not like.”105 Indeed, that may well be why some 
 
 93. Id. § 3553(a)(1). 
 94. Id. § 3553(a)(2)(A). 
 95. Id. § 3553(a)(2)(B). 
 96. Id. § 3553(a)(2)(C). 
 97. Id. § 3553(a)(2)(D). 
 98. Id. § 3553(a)(6). 
 99. Id. § 3553(a)(7). 
 100. In United States v. Dean, 414 F.3d 725 (7th Cir. 2005), the Seventh Circuit indicated that a 
detailed consideration of the § 3553(a) factors would double the work of a sentencing judge. Id. at 729. 
The court reasoned that district courts required to consider the factors would continue to have to 
compute the Guidelines sentence as before but would not also have to specifically address each of the 
§ 3553(a) factors, which are “vague and, worse perhaps, hopelessly open-ended.” Id. Instead, the 
Seventh Circuit required only an “adequate statement of the judge’s reasons”—whatever that means. 
Id. 
 101. See, e.g., Carrie Leonetti, De Facto Mandatory: A Quantitative Assessment of Reasonableness 
Review After Booker, 66 DEPAUL L. REV. 51, 60 (2016). In describing the doctrinal uncertainty post-
Booker, Professor Carrie Leonetti noted, “Some circuits vest an inordinate amount of discretion at the 
district court level, which is unreviewable in practice. At the other end of the spectrum, some circuits 
vest much more discretion at the appellate level.” Id. 
 102. Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 51 (2007). 
 103. See supra notes 28–31 and accompanying text. 
 104. See, e.g., United States v. Martinez, 821 F.3d 984, 989–90 (8th Cir. 2016) (holding that the 
defendant’s criminal history and gang membership could not justify an above-Guidelines sentence 
without “sufficient justifications” while also declining to give examples of such justifications for future 
courts). 
 105. United States v. Rigas, 583 F.3d 108, 123 (2d Cir. 2009). In fact, while warning about 
appellate courts going too far in “tinkering” with district court sentences, the panel outlined a standard 
for substantive review quite similar to the standards in other common-law high courts: 
The manifest-injustice, shocks-the-conscience, and substantive unreasonableness standards in 
appellate review share several common factors. First, they are deferential to district courts and 
provide relief only in the proverbial “rare case.” Second, they are highly contextual and do not 
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courts conflate the requirements for substantive and procedural reasonableness; 
American jurisprudence is far—far—more comfortable with procedural 
review.106 
The result is a U.S. sentencing system that is neither fish nor fowl. It 
provides neither a robust Administrative Procedure Act107-like review of the 
Guidelines, holding them up for critical analysis, nor is it a fulsome, substantive 
sentencing theory based on proportionality, as one might find in other common-
law countries. We have seen U.S. sentencing swing from indeterminate 
sentencing in the 1980s, when a trial judge’s sentencing discretion was virtually 
unlimited, to the opposite: the rigid Guidelines and mandatory minimum 
system. And without a meaningful common law of sentencing independent of 
the Guidelines to homogenize sentencing to some degree and create a core of 
common principles, there is a risk that the Guidelines will continue to be the 
default.108 In that case, the Guidelines regime that will make its full-throated 
return could well include incoherent sentencing definitions and standards which 
should have been challenged long ago. 
 
permit easy repetition in successive cases. Third, they are dependent on the informed intuition 
of the appellate panel that applies these standards. In sum, these standards provide a backstop 
for those few cases that, although procedurally correct, would nonetheless damage the 
administration of justice because the sentence imposed was shockingly high, shockingly low, 
or otherwise unsupportable as a matter of law. 
Id. For a critique of a comparable “manifestly excessive” or “manifestly inadequate” standard in 
Australia, see Sarah Krasnostein & Arie Freiberg, Pursuing Consistency in an Individualistic Sentencing 
Framework: If You Know Where You’re Going, How Do You Know When You’ve Got There?, 76 L. & 
CONTEMP. PROBS. 265, 274–75 (2013). But the difference between the Australian appellate courts and 
the few U.S. appellate courts that have adopted a “manifestly excessive” or “manifest injustice” 
standard is the expertise of the respective courts and the law they interpret. Australian appellate courts 
have “an extensive sentencing jurisprudence, as well as principles to guide appellate intervention.” Id. 
at 274. The “intuitions” of the court have been honed by appellate review of sentences over decades. 
And Australian appellate courts are interpreting judge-made rules, which they can alter as the cases 
require. They are not interpreting the contrived guidelines of a flawed Commission to whom too much 
deference has already been paid. 
 106. See United States v. Ressam, 593 F.3d 1095, 1107 (9th Cir. 2010), amended by 629 F.3d 793 (9th 
Cir. 2010), vacated en banc, 679 F.3d 1069 (9th Cir. 2012), which Professor Leonetti identified as “a 
good example of how this confusion stemming from Booker and subsequent Supreme Court decisions 
play out in practice.” Leonetti, supra note 101, at 58; see also Setser v. United States, 566 U.S. 231, 244 
(2012) (holding against petitioner in part because he identified “no flaw in the District Court’s 
decisionmaking process”); Tim Cone, Substantive Reasonableness Review of Federal Criminal Sentences: A 
Proposed Standard, 33 N. ILL. U. L. REV. 65, 72 (2012) (reflecting procedural and substantive confusion 
by suggesting that substantive reasonableness was about the “soundness of the decision-making process 
that led to a sentence” rather than the end result). 
 107. Pub. L. No. 79-404, 60 Stat. 237 (1946) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 5 
U.S.C.). 
 108. Pub. L. No. 79-404, 60 Stat. 237 (1946) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 5 
U.S.C.). 
 A Cure Worse than the Disease, 29 FED. SENT’G REP. 104, 104 (2016) (acknowledging and responding 
to Judge Pryor’s argument for a return to “a version of the pre-Booker mandatory Guidelines with strict 
appellate review of Commission-controlled departures”). 
99 N.C. L. REV. 1369 (2021) 
1390 NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 99-5 
 
